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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the problem addressed in this thesis, the solution to the
problem, the thesis statement, and the subject systems that are used in the evaluation.
1.1 Problem Description
A wide number of software tools are available that look for coding bugs such
as a hard-coded password in a system .1 However, tools that look for architectural
flaws (e.g., storing unencrypted password) of the system are less mature. Such a
tool requires a thorough evaluation. The underlying analysis of the tool can be
dynamic or it can be static. Dynamic analysis runs on specific inputs whereas static
analysis exploits all possible paths in the program. Although static analysis explores
all possible paths, the tool may report more than the actual numbers of flaws in the
system (false positives). Moreover, an analysis tool also needs to be scalable to large
subject systems. Thus, such a tool requires a rigorous evaluation on large subject
systems of a variety of domains, such as Android and the Web.
1.1.1 Coding Bugs and Architectural Flaws
Architectural flaws account for 50% of the security vulnerabilities .2 Finding an
architectural flaw requires the tool to analyze a high-level representation of the system
rather than the code level. On the other hand, to find a coding bug, it only requires
to analyze one method of one class at a time and does not require to track the
transitive dataflow communication between objects. For instance, to find a hard-
coded IP address in the code, the analysis needs to scan through all the hard-coded
strings and match with the signature of the IP address. However, it is not sufficient
to explore a code statement that writes confidential information into a file and define
the statement as an architectural flaw. The security properties of the dataflow object
2(e.g., the information) and the file object are also important to consider. An architect
assigns security properties to the source, the destination and the dataflow objects to
query the high-level representation of the system in order to find the flaw.
1.1.2 Security Vulnerability and Architectural Flaw
By definition, in computer security, a vulnerability is referred to a weakness that
allows an attacker to compromise the system’s security infrastructure 1. The exploita-
tion of a security vulnerability requires to pass through more than one process of the
system, at each of which the exploitation can be stopped.3 Some architectural flaws
can be significant enough to potentially compromise the system security. One of the
solutions for finding such an architectural flaw is Architectural Risk Analysis (ARA).
ARA generates a forest-level view of the system that contains runtime components
of a system and connections between them .4 The architects use the view to assign
security properties and check constraints. However, ARA is manual and can miss
some potential components and communication edges. Another proposed solution is
to extract a high-level diagram of the system called an Object Graph (OGraph). An
OGraph represents the abstract runtime structure of the system as a graph in which a
node is defined as an abstract object and an edge represents the communication be-
tween two objects. Architects find the vulnerabilities by assigning security properties
to the components (objects and edges) and writing security constraints .5
1.2 Analysis Tools
A few analysis tools that find security vulnerabilities are Coverity ,6 HP Fortify
,7 Cigital Secure Assist 8 etc. In this thesis, I evaluate a static analysis tool called
Scoria. Scoria is a Java-based analysis tool that finds the security vulnerabilities that
are architectural flaws of a system. Scoria generates a global sound hierarchical object
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulnerability (computing)
3graph (OGraph). A sound abstract OGraph represents all the objects and dataflow
edges that may exist at runtime. A system architect finds the vulnerabilities by
querying the OGraph. Scoria was evaluated on a number of test cases. Some of
these test cases are Android-based small applications adopted from the DroidBench
9 benchmark and the rest of the test cases are devised. DroidBench is a micro-
benchmark that contains small test cases.
1.3 Thesis Statement
Scoria finds security vulnerabilities that are architectural flaws in medium to large
subject systems from different application domains and does not generate many false
positives.
1.3.1 Hypotheses
To support the thesis statement, I propose two hypotheses:
H1. Scoria finds security vulnerabilities that are architectural flaws in medium to
large subject systems from different application domains.
H2. Scoria does not generate many false positives.
1.4 Systems to Evaluate
I select a number of criteria to choose the subject systems: the type of the system
(in order to support the hypothesis H1), the code size (KLOC), and the object-
oriented properties of the system. Scoria was evaluated on a system named UPMA
(Universal Password Manager for Android) which is around 4 KLOC.10 I choose
three subject systems two of which are around 6 KLOC and one is around 25 KLOC.
I choose two Android applications: Muspy and Ermete SMS and one web application
(WebGoat) (Table 1.1). While WebGoat is a deliberately vulnerable application,
4
Table 1.1: Statistics of the subject systems
Subject App. Type KLOC (approx.) Packages Classes Interfaces Methods
Muspy Android 6 14 115 1 376
Ermete SMS Android 6 9 48 0 198
WebGoat Web 25 22 191 2 1509
the other two systems are also potentially vulnerable applications. Both of these
Android systems require user authentication, maintain user profiles and save confi-
dential information into local databases. All of the systems were implemented using
object-oriented programming techniques. Table 1.1 shows some metrics about the
subject systems and how they are consistent with the selection criteria.
1.5 Results of the Subject Systems and Contribution
I evaluate Scoria over three subject systems by annotating the code, typechecking
the annotations, extracting the OGraphs, refining the annotations and writing con-
straints. The results show that there are interesting security vulnerabilities in Muspy
and Ermete SMS that point to the common architectural flaws in Android devel-
opment. The results also show that Scoria detects security vulnerabilities in larger
systems. I discuss the precision of the analysis results with respect to the generated
false positives.
1.6 Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives some background
on available approaches and the underlying Scoria approach. Chapter 3 explains the
detailed subject system Muspy, the annotation process, the extraction of the OGraph
and the constraints writing. Chapter 4 describes Ermete SMS, the annotation process,
the extraction of the OGraph and the constraints. Chapter 5 explains the architecture
of WebGoat, the annotation process, the OGraph extraction, the refinement of the an-
5notations and the constraints. Chapter 6 discusses and validates the thesis statement
by evaluating the results. Chapter 7 discusses related work that evaluated software
analysis tools. Chapter 8 discusses the contribution of the thesis along with possible
future work.
6CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
This chapter gives some background on the underlying analysis type, i.e., the
static analysis, some advantages of static analysis over dynamic analysis, and the
process of applying the Scoria approach.
2.1 Static Analysis
To resolve potential security vulnerabilities, two types of analysis have been de-
veloped; static analysis and dynamic analysis. A static analysis is performed without
actually executing the programs. Although dynamic analysis can be successful by pre-
cisely identifying the system behavior on specific inputs, there are certain advantages
of static analysis over dynamic analysis.
2.1.1 Static vs Dynamic Analysis
A dynamic analysis is dependent on the program execution and deals with the
runtime values. It may also require loading of special libraries and recompilation of
the code. A dynamic analysis can detect the dynamic dependencies of a program. It
can extract a dynamic hierarchical object graph where a child object can be found
at the descendant level of its parent .10 A dynamic object graph may have thousands
of nodes; however, it requires extensive graph summarization to obtain an abstract
graph.
Moreover, dynamic analysis cannot guarantee the identification of the vulnerabil-
ities since all the input scenarios cannot be tested. On the contrary, a static analysis
is sound in the sense that it considers all the program execution paths and thus, it is
independent of the input.
Additionally, the exploitation of security vulnerabilities is not necessarily causes
by a malicious input. An attacker can exploit vulnerability by providing a valid
7input. This is because an architectural flaw may exist due to a dataflow from a
source object to an untrusted destination which may not be detected by dynamic
analysis. For example, consider a web application that uses a hidden input field that
stores monetary values temporarily. Since the input field takes numeric values as
input, tampering the field will not be recognized by the dynamic analysis. A static
analysis, on the other hand, can find this vulnerability by analyzing the security
properties of the input object and the dataflow object that represents the monetary
values.
2.1.2 Hierarchical Object Graph
The static analysis tool, Scoria extracts a hierarchical abstract object graph
(OGraph) based on the annotations of the code and the abstract runtime structure of
the system. The elements of an OGraph are OObjects (abstract objects), ODomains
(conceptual group of objects) and OEdges, the dataflow communication edges be-
tween the objects. An ODomain can contain multiple OObjects and an OObject in
turn can have zero or more domains. An OGraph is sound in the aspect that it shows
all possible communication edges between two runtime objects. Soundness also guar-
antees that one particular runtime object cannot have two different representatives
in the OGraph.
2.1.3 Extracting information from the Object Graph
Using the OGraph, a security architect can visualize the domains (conceptual
grouping of objects), abstract objects, hierarchies of the objects and dataflow commu-
nication edges.10 The architect can reason about the transitive dataflow information
from a source to a destination through object hierarchy and object reachability and
can reason about a security vulnerability issue. There may also be a direct dataflow
edge between a source and a destination object for which an architect assigns secu-
8rity properties to the connecting objects and edges to check if confidential information
flows to the untrusted destination.
2.2 The Scoria Approach
In this thesis I evaluate if Scoria can find security vulnerabilities.
The Scoria approach consists of a number of steps. These steps are annotate the
code, extracting the SecGraph, refine the annotations, write constraints and trace
suspicious edges. In the following sections I will discuss each one in turn.
2.2.1 Annotate the code
The first step of the Scoria approach is to annotate the source code. The an-
notations reflect the design intent of the architect. The architect annotates each
class, variable, field and method return type. After adding annotations, the architect
typechecks the annotations using a typechecker1. The typecheker shows a number
of warnings and their priorities. The architect needs to address the warnings by the
order of the priorities. A portion of the annotated code of the CourSys application is
shown in Fig. 2.1. CourSys is a samll java application that manages students, courses
and registration of courses of a schooling system.
2.2.2 Extracting the OGraph
Scoria extracts the OGraph from the annotated code and creates the SecGraph.
SecGraph is a wrapper of the OGraph that allows the architects to assign security
properties to the objects and the edges in order to query the graph. Depending on
the size of the system, the size of the OGraph may be very large. For a small sub-
ject system (e.g., an Android application in DroidBench benchmark), the generated
1The typechecker is currently integrated with eclipse, so all the work has to be done in IDE
9class Main<"user", "logic", "data","owned"> {
Data<data <owned>> objData = null;
Logic<logic <data, owned>> objLogic = null;
Client<user<logic, owned>> objClient = null;
public void run(){
objData = new Data(studentFile, courseFile);
objLogic = new Logic(objData);
ILogic<logic> logic = objLogic;
objClient = new Client(logic);
objClient.execute();
}
public static void main(String<lent[shared]> args[]) {
String<shared> arg0 = args[0];
String<shared> arg1 = args[1];
try {
Main<lent> system = new Main(arg0, arg1);
system.run();
}
catch (Exception<lent> e) {
System.out.println("Unexpected exception");
}
}
}
Figure 2.1: Annotated main class of CourSys application
OGraph is usually small and easily interpretable. For large subject systems, however,
it may be difficult to follow the dataflow communication edges especially in the case
of object hierarchy and indirect communication. Hence, I extract and look at the
Ownership Object Graph (OOG) of the annotated system. OOG is the hierarchical
representation of the abstract runtime structure that provides a collapsed view of
the system in which objects of a domain are nested into the parent object that is
the owner of the domain. OGraph is the internal representation of the OOG. As an
example, the OGraph and the OOG of the CourSys application are shown in Fig. 2.2
and Fig. 2.3 respectively. In this example, objLogic:Logic has log:Logging and
lock:RWLock objects in its owning domain (Fig. 2.2), however, in the OOG, these
two objects are collapsed in the objLogic:Logic (Fig. 2.3).
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2.2.3 Refine the Annotations
An architect may need to refine the annotations for two types of scenarios: a) keep
the annotations consistent with the design intent and code and b) prevent objects
from getting merged by the analysis. The architect can modify the annotations to
keep the analysis consistent with the design intent and the code. For instance, object
o:O may be initially annotated in domain U. However, it can be found that o:O is an
important object that contain confidential information or a wrapper of an important
object. As a result, the architect modifies the annotation to domain D that may
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usually contain the important objects. The architect can check the OOG, refine the
annotations and can re-extract the OOG and iterate the same process until the OOG
reflects the design intent. Second, some of the vulnerabilities may not be found due
to excessive merging (abstraction), and it is required to separate a target instance of
a particular type and annotate it in a distinct domain to prevent merging. Thus, the
separated object with relevant edges will appear in the OGraph and will be available
for the architect to assign security properties while writing constraints.
2.2.4 Write Constraints
Scoria has five different types of queries that help the architect to minimize the
effort of writing constraints to find vulnerabilities; Object Provenance, Object Tran-
sitivity, Object Hierarchy, Object Reachability and Indirect Communication. These
features are depicted in Fig. 2.4. The images are repeated here to make this document
more self-contained .10
Object Provenance is a query that returns a set of dataflow edges if same object
flows from two different set of sources to two different set of destinations. For instance,
if object o:O flows from a:A to b:B and it also flows from c:C to d:D, the analysis
will report two suspicious dataflow edges regarding the same flow object o:O (Fig. 2.4
(a)).
Object Transitivity is the communication that reflects the transitive flow of a
particular object in a communication path between two objects where the destination
object may be untrusted. For example, o:O can flow transitively from a:A to c:C in
which multiple objects can be found in the communication path between a:A and c:C
(Fig. 2.4 (b)).
Object Hierarchy is defined as the descendants and ancestors of an object o:O where
confidential information can be found in a descendant of o:O. However, instead of
passing the descendant object, o:O is passed from a source to an untrusted destination.
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Thus, the destination has an access to the information (Fig. 2.4 (c)).
Object Reachability is defined as a path that exists between a flow object of one
path to a predefined object. For instance, flow object c:C of the communicating
objects a:A and b:B is reachable to the object o:O, if there is a path exists between
c:C to o:O (Fig. 2.4 (d)).
Indirect Communication refers to an indirect path that exists from a source a:A
to a destination b:B if a dataflow or creation edge exists from a descendant of a:A to
a descendant of b:B (Fig. 2.4 (e)).
2.2.5 Trace Suspicious Edges
The architect implements the constraints as test cases using the features of Scoria.
Running the test cases shows a number of suspicious communicating edges in the
console window (if any) that includes the corresponding lines of code of method
invocations or field writes. Thus, the architect can trace the lines of code responsible
for the edges. The analysis may warn about some irrelevant suspicious edges (false
positives) alongside the true edges.
2.2.6 Compute AF-Index
The security architect computes the Architectural Flaw Index (AF-index) of each
constraint that determines if a vulnerability is an architectural flaw or a coding bug.
The AF-index classifies security vulnerabilities along a continuum ranging from coding
bugs to architectural flaws.11 The AF-index attempts to classify each vulnerability as
an architectural flaw. In this thesis, the AF-index ranges from 1 to 10. Each Scoria
feature has a weight and the AF-index of a vulnerability is the weighted sum of the
values of all the features used in a constraint. Since object provenance and indirect
communication are difficult to reason about, a higher value 3 is assigned to these
13
a:A
b:B
c:C
d:D
o:O
o:O
o:O
(a) Object Provenance
a:A b:B c:C
o:O
o:O
o:O o:O
(b) Object Transitivity
a:A b:B
desc:D
anc:Anc
o:O
parent:P
o:O
child1:C1
o2:O2
child2:C2
(c) Object Hierarchy
b:B
c:C
c:C
a:A
d:D o:O
(d) Object Rechability
 :A
d:D
f:F
o:Oo:O
o:O
b:B
child1:C1
desc:D
(e) Indirect Communi-
cation
Legend
o:O
o:O
Object
Dataflow
Communication
Points-to
Communication
Dataflow refers to
object
Parent-child relation in
object hierarchy
o:O
Indirect
Communication
Figure 2.4: Scoria Features
features and a value of 2 is assigned to the object transitivity and object hierarchy.
Security properties are assigned a value of 1. The higher the weighted sum of the
used features in a constraint, the more likely a vulnerability is an architectural flaw.
The following chapters discuss the subject systems, the detailed process of ap-
plying the Scoria approach over the systems and the corresponding results of the
analysis.
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CHAPTER 3: MUSPY
The chapter gives an overview of the first subject system, its functionality, its
architecture and constraints that find vulnerabilities in the system.
3.1 Muspy Overview
Muspy is a free Android application that notifies the users who expressed interest
when their favorite artists release new albums1. Muspy targets music lovers who do
not want to miss any album from their favorite artists or learn about new albums after
many days of their releases. Moreover, it saves the users’ from having to constantly
check the official websites of the artists.
Following are the features of Muspy:
1. Sign In and Sign Out: A user can create a new account by providing an email
id and a password. Email activation is required after which the user is allowed
to sign in to the system. The user can log out from the system by clicking
the sign out button and there is no internal caching functionality of the login
credentials.
2. Reset Password: In case of forgetting the password, a user can reset her pass-
word by providing the email address and Muspy sends a password reset link to
the email address.
3. Add and Remove Artists: A user can follow artists by searching for the artists
and adding them to the account and can unfollow them by clicking the remove
button. The user can also share information of each album release to social
media. Moreover, Muspy allows the users to achieve more information regarding
1https://muspy.com/
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each album release through youtube, Last.FM, Wikipedia, Spotify, Amazon and
Discogs.
4. Import Artists: A user can add all or a portion of top artists (25%, 50%, 75%
and 100%) from their Last.FM profiles by inserting their Last.FM profiles’ user
names.
5. Notifications: A user gets an automatic email notification for each new album
release. Each new released album is also added to the list of albums of each
favorite artist of a user.
3.2 System Architecture
Muspy is 6 KLOC, so it is a mid-size Android system. I study the architecture of
the system reading the available documentation, browsing the code and by drawing
the dataflow diagram (DFD) by hand. I measure some code statistics (shown in
Table 1.1) of Muspy by running a tool named Metrics2.
3.2.1 DFD
I inspect the code to understand the architecture and manually draw (since there
is no documented DFD) the data flow diagram (DFD) of the system before starting
the Scoria analysis for Muspy. I draw two levels of DFDs (DFD Level-1 and DFD
Level-2) and manually check the conformance of the OOG with the DFD Level-2
to see if the extracted OOG matches the design intent, and is comparable to the
diagrams I drew.
2http://metrics2.sourceforge.net/
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DFD Level-1
Muspy has five complex processes, two data storages and the external user. The
DFD shows the processes (Fig. 3.1), the data storage, the external user and the
corresponding communication edges between the processes.
1. Artist Activity: A complex activity that contains multiple single processes each
of which represents an activity relevant to an artist. An external interactor can
communicates with the complex process, “Service Manager” via each individual
process (Fig. 3.1).
2. Release Activity: “Release activity” shows detail information for each album
release of an artist. It communicates with the “Service Manager” and the
“external user” (Fig. 3.1).
3. User Account Activity: This complex process consists of all the account related
activities; the activities for signin, signup, reset password and user account
settings. User account activity communicates with the complex processes: the
“Service Manager” and the “Credential Manager”.
4. Service Manager: “Service Manager” consists of a client process, a utility pro-
cess and one user settings process. It provides HTTP services to other processes
to perform the GET and the POST operations. It is also responsible for com-
municating with the data storage (Fig. 3.1).
5. Credential Manager: This process encrypts and decrypts a user’s password
before storing into and retrieving from the data storage. (Fig. 3.1).
6. Unprotected Data: The unprotected data storage stores the insecure informa-
tion related to artists’ data. Data are pulled and pushed from this storage
through HTTP protocols.
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Figure 3.1: Muspy DFD Level-1
7. Protected Data: This storage stores sensitive user information. Muspy uses a
local database (Android SharedPreference) to store the protected data. Pro-
tected data are saved and accessed through the “Credential Manager” process
(Fig. 3.1).
DFD Level-2
The DFD level-2 shows the decomposition of several components of the Level-1
DFD. Following are the components of the DFD Level-2:
1. My Artist Activity (Artist Activity): This activity takes the artist name as a
parameter and communicates with the “Muspy Client” process to fetch corre-
sponding artist’s data (Fig. 3.2). When a user is logged in to the system, this
activity populates the favorite artists of the user by default.
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2. Search Artist Activity (Artist Activity): This activity passes an artist name as
a parameter and retrieves the data through the “Muspy Client” component of
the “Service Manager”.
3. Import Last FM activity (Artist Activity): This activity imports the list of
artists from a user’s Last.FM profile to Muspy through HTTP protocols.
4. Signup Activity (User Account Activity): This process sends user login creden-
tials to the “Service Manager” through HTTP request and simultaneously sends
it to the “Credential Manager” in order to store the data in the local database
(Fig. 3.2).
5. Signin Activity (User Account Activity): This activity takes the email and
the password and checks them against the locally stored data records before
allowing the user to login.
6. Reset Password Activity (User Account Activity): This activity sends the user’s
email address to the “Muspy Client” which in turn sends a link to the email
address to perform the reset operation (Fig. 3.2).
7. Settings Activity (User Account Activity): “Settings activity” allows the user
to change and save account settings and notifications.
8. Muspy Client (Service Manager): “Muspy client” is a service provider process
that works as a middleware and convey bidirectional communication with the
activity classes (in the UI) and the data storage. For instance, a user searches
for a favorite artist by providing an artist name to the “Muspy Client” and the
client performs HTTP get operation to retrieve the artists’ information.
9. Utils (Service Manager): This utility class is responsible to retrieve a user cre-
dentials stored in local data storage.
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10. User Settings (Service Manager): “Muspy Client” gets each user’s settings as an
object of the “User Settings” class. It extracts necessary information from the
object (e.g., notification settings) to perform relevant operations (e.g., notify
the user if sending notification is enabled).
11. Muspy Application (Credential Manager): “Muspy Application” is the top level
process of the “Credential Manager” that maintains the dataflow communica-
tion between the processes of the “Service Manager”, the user account activity
processes and with the local data storage. It also communicates with the “Sim-
ple Crypto” process in order to encrypt and decrypt the password.
12. Simple Crypto (Credential Manager): This process encrypts/decrypts the pass-
word and receives/pass it from/to the “Muspy Application” (Fig. 3.2).
3.3 Annotation Process
The first step of the Scoria Analysis is to annotate the code. I import the Muspy
system into Eclipse as an Android application and annotate the code. After adding
the annotations, I run the typechecker and address the typechecker warnings.
3.3.1 Design Intent
I use existing documentation and inspect the code of Muspy and the code seems
to follow the design intent as State-Logic-Display. The intent consists of three archi-
tectural tiers. I choose three top level domains to represent these architectural tiers;
UI (for Display), LOGIC (for Logic) and DATA (for State). The corresponding formal
domain parameters are U, L, and D allow the objects to share state across domains. I
use the owned domain to annotate strictly encapsulated objects, and annotate static
fields and string type variables into the shared domain.
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Figure 3.2: Muspy DFD Level-2
3.3.2 Default Annotations
During the annotation process, I use an existing tool named ArchDefault that
partially automates the annotation process considerably and reduces the overhead of
adding manual annotations. ArchDefault generates a map that contains a list of the
types and an architect needs to assign the required domains and domain parameters
to each type. I manually edit the map with corresponding values and properties and
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public class MuspyApplication<U, L, D> extends Application<U,L,D>
{
//Added by ANAM
public MuspyApplication(){super();}
SimpleCryptoOld<D<D>> SCO = new SimpleCryptoOld();
SimpleCrypto<D<D>> SC = new SimpleCrypto();
String<shared> email = null;
}
Figure 3.3: Code modification: missing constructor
set the properties takedomainParams as ’true’ and propagateToSubTypes as ’true’
to propagate the domain parameters across subtypes. I validate the map using the
validation functionality of the tool before the default annotations.
3.3.3 Root Class and Manual Annotations
Although ArchDefault adds most of the annotations and propagates the domain
parameters to the subtypes, the architect may need to modify some of the existing
annotations and manually annotate the complex expressions that the tool does not
consider. This is because ArchDefault is not a smart inference tool. It may add
annotations that do not typecheck. I modify the annotations in order to preserve
its consistency with the design intent. I also add annotations that are missed by
the default tool especially in case of primitive types and types from the referenced
libraries. Based on the priority of the warnings generated by the typechecker, I
update the annotations. I minimize the number of warnings to 176 from around
5000 warnings. I modify the code in a few cases e.g., missing public constructor.
For example, MuspyApplication had a private constructor that prevents the type for
being instantiated (Fig. 3.3).
As the Scoria analysis starts from the entry point of a root class, I manually
prepare a root class by instantiating some of the uninstantiated objects. I also declare
the three top level domains (UI, LOGIC and DATA) in the root class.
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Figure 3.4: Muspy OOG (Three top-level domains and collapsed objects)
3.4 Object Graph Extraction
I extract the OOG of Muspy. I also extract the OGraph to observe the internal
representation of the OOG, and the dataflow communication edges between the ob-
jects. I manually study the conformance of the OOG with the extracted DFD Level-2
of the system.
The OGraph of Muspy is large enough to zoom in and follow the dataflow edges
between the objects. The expanded view of the OOG is also very large. The collapsed
view and the expanded view of one object (“MuspyClient”) of the OOG have been
shown in (Fig. 3.4), and (Fig. 3.5) respectively.
3.5 Conformance with the DFD
In the conformance diagram (Fig. 3.7), a black arrow represents a points to
edge, a red arrow shows an export edge, and a blue arrow represents an import
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Figure 3.5: Muspy OOG expanded view of MuspyClient
edge. The dotted boxes represent three top level domains. The diagram shows
the dataflow communication edges between RelseaseActivity and MuspyClient
in which ReleaseActivity sends ’MBID’ (unique MusicBrainzID of an artist) to
the MuspyClient (shown by an export edge) and MuspyClient returns the re-
leases information (shown by an import edge) of an artist that writes a field of the
ArtistActivity object. Similarly, there are both an import and an export data
communications edges from MuspyApplication to SharedPreference.
3.6 Refinement of the Annotations
Since String type objects are annotated in the shared domain by the default tool,
some of the strings are significant but get merged in the OGraph with less significant
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Figure 3.6: Muspy DFD (L-2)
objects. As a result, important dataflow edges relevant to a particular String object
may be missing. For instance, the ’password’ field of type MyspyApplication was
initially annotated in the shared domain. I modify the annotation to the DATA
domain to keep consistency with the design intent. The intent is that the DATA
domain should contain all the significant objects of the system including the login
credentials. Moreover, changing the annotation in one statement of the program may
lead to annotation warnings elsewhere. I modify the annotation of the “Password”
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Figure 3.7: Muspy OOG Conformance L-2
class MuspyApplication<U, L, D> extends Application<U, L, D> {
String<shared> passCryp = null;
String<D> passCryp = new String();
passCryp = null;
passCryp = SC.encrypt(Constants.SECRET.SEED, pass);
}
class SimpleCrypto<D> {
String<D> encrypt(String<shared> seed, String<D> cleartext){
if(cleartext == null)
return null;
byte[]<shared> rawKey = getRawKey(seed.getBytes());
byte[]<shared> result = encrypt(rawKey, cleartext.getBytes());
return toHex(result);
}
}
Figure 3.8: Refinement of annotation: prevention of merging objects
field to the DATA domain which is set by a method invocation (encrypt method) of
the SimpleCrypto object (Fig. 3.8). Thus, the return type of the encrypt method
of SimpleCrypto is also required to assign in the DATA domain (Fig. 3.8).
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3.7 Constraints
I implement two constraints for the subject system Muspy. The first constraint
evaluates if Scoria can detect an injected vulnerability regarding the Android log file.
The second constraint addresses one architectural flaw that is common in Android
application development.
3.7.1 Constraint-1: Vulnerability regarding Android
SHAREDPREFERENCE
Android SHAREDPREFERENCE. Android SHAREDPREFERENCE is an interface
to store and manipulate data locally of the device. SHAREDPREFERENCE is an xml
data structure that stores the data in key-value pairs. It allows primitive data types:
Boolean, Float, Int, Long and String. An Android developer can easily access an
instance of the SHAREDPREFERENCE by invoking the getSharedPreferences method.
Multiple SHAREDPREFERENCE objects can exist in a single application.
Device loss is common these days and attackers can get easy access to personal
as well as corporate data once they get hold of a device. Corporate data can contain
secret information that can lead an attacker to hack into significant resources. The
consequences of attacking a lost device can be worse if the device is rooted with
permission. There are a number of tools available to enroot a device that can allow
an attacker to access all locally stored data (e.g., TowelRoot, KlingoRoot etc.)3.
Hence, the local storage (SHAREDPREFERENCE) is vulnerable to attack. Encrypting
the confidential data can be an effective measure to secure the data.
The entire process of the SHAREDPREFERENCE attack (of a lost Android device)
includes two actors; an Android developer and an Attacker. The developer stores
sensitive data (e.g., user name, password) into the SHAREDPREFERENCE in an xml
3http://www.askvg.com/guide-how-to-root-android-mobile-phones-and-tablets/
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Figure 3.9: Vulnerability of SHAREDPREFERENCE (attacker accesses the local storage)
format. On the other hand, an attacker can enroot the device (if not rooted), and
access the contents of the SHAREDPREFERENCE (Fig. 3.9). In this example, the attacker
can access the contents of the “username” and “password” fields that have the values
’kepLar01’, and ’kepL@r0!’ respectively (Fig. 3.9).
Implementation
While signing in, a user provides the user name and the password and Muspy
stores the encrypted password into SHAREDPREFERENCE. SignHandler (private class
of SignInActivity) passes the un-encrypted credentials to the MuspyApplication
(Fig. 3.10). Although MuspyApplication encrypts the password, there may be an
execution in which SHAREDPREFERENCE can receive an un-encrypted password to store
(Catch block, Fig. 3.10).
I draw a partial OGraph showing the objects and the edges related to the
vulnerability in order to depict the vulnerability regarding SHAREDPREFERENCE
(Fig. 3.11). ma:MuspyApplication imports (blue edge) the password
(passCryp:String) from act:SignInActivity and exports (red edge) it to
the editor:SharedPreference.Editor (Fig. 3.11). Both ma:MuspyApplication
and editor:SharedPreference.Editor are annotated to be in the DATA domain.
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class SignInActivity<U,L,D> extends AbstractActivity<U, L, D>{
private class SignHandler<U, L, D> extends Handler<U, L, D>{
void handleMessage(Message<D> msg) {
MuspyApplication<D<U,L,D>> muspyApplication = (MuspyApplication)
getActivity().getApplication();
String<D> pass = getActivity().passwordEditText.getText().toString();
String<shared> email = getActivity().emailEditText.getText().toString();
String<shared> userID = getActivity().userSettings.getId();
muspyApplication.setCredentials(email, pass, userID);
}
}
}
class MuspyApplication<U,L,D> extends Application<U,L,D>{
void setCredentials(){
String<D> passCryp = new String();
Editor<D<U,L,D>> editor = new Editor();
try {
if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT < Constants.API_421) {
passCryp = SCO.encrypt(Constants.SECRET.SEED, pass);
}
else{
passCryp = SC.encrypt(Constants.SECRET.SEED, pass);
}
catch (Exception<shared> e){
passCryp = pass;
}
editor.putString(Constants.PREF_PASS, passCryp);
editor.putString(Constants.PREF_USERID, userID);
editor.commit();
}
}
Figure 3.10: Unencrypted password is stored while executing catch statement)
Result
I use the object provenance and object transitivity features of Scoria to address
this vulnerability and implement the constraint. According to the object prove-
nance, the sensitive object (passCryp:String) that flows from act:SignInActivity
to ma:MuspyApplication should not also flow from ma:MuspyApplication to
editor:SharedPreference.Editor. The implementation of the constraint (as a
JUnit test) is shown in Fig. 3.12. I run the test case and Scoria finds the sus-
picious edge with no false positive. Scoria shows the suspicious export edge from
ma:MuspyApplication to editor:SharedPreference.Editor with the flow object
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Figure 3.11: SHAREDPREFERENCE vulnerability (partial OGraph)
passCryp:String due to the method invocation editor.putString() (Fig. 3.13).
3.7.2 Constraint-2: Vulnerability regarding Android system
Log
An Android developer can use the default logging functionality of the android.util
package to store the system logs. Although Android log files are not generally visible,
the Android logging system allows a developer to access and view the stack traces
of the system failures and all system messages that help the developer to debug the
errors (using LogCat). LogCat is a command-line functionality that allows the user
to search for logs of various programs. LogCat can be used with adb (Android Debug
Bridge) command shell (e.g.,[adb] logcat [option] ... [filter-spec] ...,).
Moreover, a number of tools are available to visually look into the contents of the
log files (e.g., aLogCat, LogViewer etc.) that make the Android logs more vulnerable.
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@Test
void CheckPasswordVulnerabilityObjectProvenance() {
Set<IObject> cryptos = secGraph.getObjectsByCond(new InstanceOf(
"com.danielme.muspyforandroid.activities.SignInActivity.SignHandler"));
Set<IObject> muspyApps = secGraph.getObjectsByCond(new InstanceOf(
"com.danielme.muspyforandroid.MuspyApplication"));
Set<IObject> logs = secGraph.getObjectsByCond(new InstanceOf(
"com.danielme.muspyforandroid.Editor"));
Assert.assertFalse(cryptos.isEmpty());
Assert.assertFalse(muspyApps.isEmpty());
Assert.assertFalse(logs.isEmpty());
boolean isSecure = true;
for (IObject cp : cryptos){
for (IObject mu : muspyApps){
for (IObject lg : logs){
Set<DataFlowEdge> sEdges = secGraph.checkObjectProvenance(
cp, mu, mu, lg);
scoria.displayWarnings(sEdges);
isSecure = isSecure && sEdges.isEmpty();
}
}
}
if (!isSecure)
System.out.println("Information disclosure found for unencrypted password");
else
System.out.println("No information disclosure found for unencrypted password");
}
Figure 3.12: Mupsy constraint1: JUnit test
Sanity Check Visitor
Sanity Check: Null getParent(): O_world
Copying the OGraph into a SecGraph
Suspicious edge : ma:MuspyApplication -> editor:Editor [passCryp:String]
MuspyApplication setCredentials editor.putString(Constants.PREF_PASS,passCryp)
Information disclosure found for unencrypted password
Figure 3.13: Mupsy constraint1: output of JUnit test
Additionally, the Android debugging tool named DDMS 4 provides a log file viewer.
With a device emulator and a connected Android device, DDMS shows the system
logs of the connected device in an Eclipse window.
4DDMS stands for Dalvik Debug Monitor Server
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Moreover, research shows that the Android log is not a trusted source to store
confidential information. Security researchers at IBM reported multiple vulnerabili-
ties when the Firefox application on Android writes the directory name of the user’s
profile in the system log .12 Although the profile directory name is randomly gener-
ated to prevent unwanted directory access, researchers were able to bypass one profile
directory name using the brute force method. I write a constraint to verify if Muspy
writes any significant information into the Android log and Scoria did not find such
a vulnerability. So, I inject a vulnerability to check if Scoria can detect the injected
vulnerability regarding the log file.
Implementation
I use the checkFlowIntoSink functionality of Scoria to check if any suspicious
edge is found regarding the flow of the confidential information to the untrusted
sink (i.e., the Log). To implement this test case, the trust level property of the
android.util.Log object is defined as low and all the String objects of the DATA
domain are labeled as confidential. The sink and the flow properties are passed to
the getFlowIntoSink method.
Result and Injected Vulnerability
The initial results of the constraint show that Muspy does not store any confiden-
tial information in the log file. I inject a vulnerability by creating a custom exception
class (InjectException inherited from the default Java Exception class). For stor-
ing the sensitive information, I retrieve the password and the email address of a Muspy
user and store it in the log file. The annotated version of the InjectException class
has been shown in (Fig. 3.15). I instantiate the InjectException in some places of
the code (Fig. 3.15).
Due to the method invocations (ma.getPass() and ma.getEmail()) in the type
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@Test
public void checkUntrustedSinkforConfidentialData() {
// Log object is not trustworthy
secGraph.setObjectProperty(TrustLevelType.Low, new InstanceOf(new Type(
"android.util.Log")));
// All strings in domain ’DATA’ are confidential
secGraph.setObjectProperty(IsConfidential.True, new IsInDomain("DATA",
new Type(String.class.getName())));
Property[] snkProps = { TrustLevelType.Low };
Property[] flwProps = { IsConfidential.True };
if (secGraph.checkFlowIntoSink(snkProps, flwProps)) {
System.err.println("Information disclosure exists.");
Set<SecEdge> sEdges = secGraph.getFlowIntoSink(snkProps, flwProps);
SecurityAnalysis.getInstance().displayWarnings(sEdges);
scoria.displayWarnings(sEdges);
} else {
System.out.println("No information disclosure found.");
}
}
Figure 3.14: Test case to verify if sensitive information is passed to Android system log
class InjectException<U, L, D> extends Exception<U, L, D> {
public InjectException() {
MuspyApplication<D<U, L, D>> ma = new MuspyApplication();
String<D> pass = ma.getPass();
String<shared> email = ma.getEmail();
Log<L> l = new Log();
l.e("Password: ", pass);
}
}
class ResetPasswordActivity<U, L, D> {
void run() {
try{
boolean<shared> isValid = resetPassword(this.emailEditText.getText());
}
catch (InjectException ex) {
throw new InjectException();
}
}
}
Figure 3.15: Custom expception (InjectException) class leaks password to log file.
InjectException, IE:InjectException retrieves the password and the email from
ma:MuspyApplication. Import edges in the partial OGraph reflect the field writes
in IE:InjectException class (Fig. 3.16). Method invocation l.e() creates an ex-
port edge from IE:InjectException to l:Log shows a flow of the confidential object
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Figure 3.16: Injected vulnerability (partial OGraph)
Sanity Check Visitor
Sanity Check: Null getParent(): O_world
Copying the OGraph into a SecGraph
Suspicious edge : IE:InjectException -> l:Log [pass:String]
InjectException InjectException l.e("Password:", pass)
Information disclosure exists
Figure 3.17: Constraint-2 (JUnit Test Case Output: Suspicious Edge(s))
pass:String (Fig. 3.16). I use object transitivity that is implemented using ob-
ject provenance. After running the constraint, Scoria finds the suspicious edges by
checking the transitive dataflow communication (Fig. 3.17).
3.8 AF-index of the vulnerabilities
Since both constraints use object transitivity and object provenance, the weighted
sum for both of these constraints are 5 in the AF-index. Thus, both of these vul-
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nerabilities rank high on the AF-index scale and are more likely to be architectural
flaws.
3.9 Conclusion
The Scoria analysis of the subject system Muspy concludes two important points;
First, Android SHAREDPREFERENCE is not trustworthy data storage to store sensitive
unencrypted information (e.g., email, password, user name, etc.). Muspy stores unen-
crypted password in the SHAREDPREFERENCE. Second, Scoria successfully reports the
non-existence of any suspicious edge when there is no vulnerability. Besides, it reports
the suspicious edge when a vulnerability is injected and confidential information is
saved in the log file.
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CHAPTER 4: ERMETE SMS
This chapter gives an overview of the Ermete SMS, its architecture, the vulnera-
bilities and some Scoria constraints that find some potential vulnerabilities.
4.1 Ermete SMS Overview
Ermete SMS is an Android application that allows the user to send free SMS via
web protocols. It is a free distribution in Google Market and available to download
from the F-Droid1 repository. Ermete SMS allows only Vodafone and TIM (Telecom
Italia Mobile) users to exchange messages with their contacts. Besides, it stores
history of messaging including message content for each account.
Ermete SMS has following features:
1. Create and Modify Accounts: A user can create a new account using a user
name and a password for the providers Vodafone and TIM. The user can also
modify the existing account information.
2. Multiple Accounts: A user can have multiple accounts and she can switch be-
tween her accounts.
3. Reset Password: In case of forgetting password, the user can reset the password
by providing the email address, and Ermete SMS sends a reset link to the email
address.
4. Send Message: A user can send a message to multiple contacts. The messages
are stored in a local storage.
5. User Notification: Ermete SMS allows the user to get notification of received
messages.
1https://f-droid.org/repository/browse/
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4.2 System Architecture
Ermete SMS is 6 KLOC, so it is a mid-size Android system. I run a metrics tool
named Stan2 in order to investigate the code statistics (shown in Table 1.1) of Ermete
SMS.
4.2.1 DFD
To understand the system, I inspect the code, run the system and use existing
software documentation. I manually draw two DFDs, a level-1 and a level-2, and
manually analyze the conformance of the Level-2 DFD with the extracted OOG.
DFD Level-1
The Level-1 DFD of Ermete SMS has three major components; complex pro-
cess, data storage and external user. Level-1 DFD contains three complex pro-
cesses, two storages and the external user (Fig. 4.1). Ermete SMS uses SQLiteDB
and Sharedpreference as data storages.
1. Account Activities: This complex process contains account related activities:
create, modify and update an account information for the telephony providers
TIM and Vodafone.
2. Account Manager: The “Account Manager” connects and manages the engine to
communicate with the TIM and the Vodafone servers through HTTP protocols.
3. SMS Service: The “SMS service” consists of an account service and processes
relevant to messaging and conversation. It also has a notification manager that
notifies the users of new incoming and outgoing messages.
2http://stan4j.com/
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Figure 4.1: Ermete SMS DFD L-1
DFD Level-2
The DFD Level-2 shows the decomposition of each complex process of the Level-1
DFD.
1. Account Overview Activity: “Account overview activity” shows the default
screen of the system that allows the user to select the account type and redirect
the user to either AccountCreateActivity or AccountModifyActivity.
2. Account Create Activity: It creates a new account object (wrapped with the
user name, the password and the provider information) and passes the object
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to the AccountModifyActivity.
3. Account Modify Activity: This activity gets existing account information from
the local storage (Sharedpreference) and verifies with the information entered
by the user. In order to update the information to the database, it communicates
with the AccountManager activity. The important dataflow edges are shown as
red color in Fig. 4.2.
4. Account Display Activity: This process shows the accounts basic information
(including the available contacts) to the user after successful login and modifica-
tion. It also shows the properties related to the user account. It communicates
with the “Account Manager” activity in order to retrieve the list of contacts of
a user. The corresponding dataflow edge (in Fig. 4.2) shows that the “Account
Manager” sends a list of accounts to the “account display activity”.
5. Compose Activity: “Compose Activity” is a part of the “SMS Service” process
and it provides the functionality of composing a new message and forwards the
composed message to the “Account Service”. It is also responsible to store
message related information (e.g., index of the message sender position into a
list).
6. Account Service: This service process is the middle layer between the “Compose
Activity” and the “Conversation Manager” in which the compose activity sends
the SMS object to the “Account Service” and it in turn sends the SMS object
to the “Conversation Manager”. It also sends the account information to the
“Account Manager”.
7. Conversation Manager: “Conversation Manager” exports the SMS to the
senders through HTTP protocol. Besides, it stores the history of messaging
to the local SQLiteDB database.
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8. Notification Manager: This class notifies the user about new incoming and
outgoing messages. It communicates with the “Account Service” process to get
the contents of the notification messages.
9. Account Manager: “Account Manager” communicates with the “SMS Service”
and with the account activity processes. It sends and receives data from the
SQLite database (Fig. 4.2).
10. Account: “Account Manager” sends the account information (e.g., User Name,
Password) to the “Account” process and receives the account object in return.
11. Account Connector: “Account Connector” sends the HttpClient object to the
account object as a field write of the account that is used later to send the SMS
to the receivers.
4.3 Annotation Process
I do not use the default annotation tool and annotate the Ermete SMS entirely
by hand.
4.3.1 Design Intent
Since the software documentation of the Ermete SMS is lacking, it is difficult to
get an architectural overview of the system. A few online resources explain the usage
of the Ermete SMS from the user point of view, however, most of the resources are
available only in Italian. I inspect the code and it seems that the code follows the
State-Logic-Display architectural style. So, I represent these tiers using three top
level domains; State as DATA domain, Logic as LOGIC and Display represents the UI.
Like Muspy, I put uninteresting objects into the shared domain and owned domain
to strictly encapsulate objects into the owning domain of an object.
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Figure 4.2: Ermete SMS DFD L-2
4.3.2 Root Class and Manual Annotations
I manually annotate all the types and the subtypes of Ermete SMS with corre-
sponding domains and domain parameters. I create a root class (Main) and declare
three top level domains. After annotating the code manually, I typecheck the an-
notations. Typechecker shows a number of warnings with their priorities. I address
the warnings according to the priorities. I stop fixing the typechecker warnings when
numbers of warnings were reaches around 150. Most of the remaining warnings are
related to static variables and fields for which the typechecker always shows warnings.
I also instantiate the uninstantiated types in the root class. I use the ArchMetrics
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SSLSocketFactory<D<U, L, D>> createCustomKeyStoreSSLSocketFactory() {
try {
KeyStore<D> keystore = KeyStore.getInstance("BKS");
//return new CustomKeyStoreSSLSocketFactory(keystore);
CustomKeyStoreSSLSocketFactory<D<U, L, D>> CSSF = new
CustomKeyStoreSSLSocketFactory(keystore);
return CSSF; //Refactored
} catch (Exception<lent> e) {
throw new AssertionError(e);
}
}
Figure 4.3: Code refactoring: anonymous return object
tool to extract the uninstantiated types.
Moreover, there are few annotation warnings due to anonymous classes of the
objects. I refactor the code and convert the anonymous classes into inner classes.
As an example in (Fig. 4.3), Moreover, there are few annotation warnings due to
anonymous instantiation of the objects. I refactor the code and instantiate them
with corresponding variable names. As an example in (Fig. 4.3), the return value of
the createCustomKeyStoreSSLSocketFactory is anonymous. I create an instance
of CustomKeyStoreSSLSocketFactory with a variable name “CSSF” and return it.
4.4 Object Graph Extraction
I extract the OOG of Ermete SMS and inspect it by expanding the nested boxes
of the OOG to verify that it matches the design intent (Fig. 4.4).
I also extract the OGraph that shows the internal representation of the OOG. the
top level domains and the corresponding OObjects: UI contains the OObjects of the
user interface (e.g., CA:ComposeActivity, intent:Intent etc.), LOGIC contains the
OObjects that deal with the business logic of the system. The rest of the OObjects are
related to the sensitive data (e.g., account, sms) and they belong to the DATA domain.
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Figure 4.4: Ownership Object Graph (OOG) of Ermete SMS
4.5 Conformance with the DFD
Since, the OGraph is large enough to follow the dataflow edges, I use a tool named
ArchDoc that maps the dataflow edges to the corresponding lines of code. The
43
conformance diagram shows the important OObjects, points to edges and the dataflow
edges. In the conformance diagram (Fig. 4.5), three top-level container domains
are shown by the dotted lines. The boxes represent the objects, the black arrows
represent the points to edges, and the blue and red edges represent the import, and
export dataflow communications respectively. An example of the conformance can be
observed by following the dataflow edges between AMAnd:AccountManagerAndroid
(subtype of the AccountManager type in DFD) and ADA:AccountDisplayActivity.
AMAnd exports a list of accounts to the ADA. The field providers:List<Account> of
AMAnd is the flow object of the corresponding communication edge.
4.6 Refinement of the Annotations
I refine the annotations because some of the important dataflow edges were miss-
ing. The developers of the Ermete SMS use complex expressions that have typechecker
warnings, and as a result some important edges are missing from the OGraph. An
example is shown in Fig. 4.6. The receiver object is anonymously created (while
invoking the method addReceiver) and passed to the sms:SMS object that causes
a missing dataflow edge. I refactor the code by creating a new instance of type
Receiver separately and pass the object as a parameter to the method invocation.
Moreover, some important objects (especially array of String object) are not ini-
tialized with the new keyword and are missed from the OGraph along with the cor-
responding edges. I modify the code by initializing the object with the new keyword
(Fig. 4.6).
4.7 Constraints
The following sections discuss the implementation of two constraints that find
security vulnerabilities of Ermete SMS.
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Figure 4.5: OOG conformance diagram with respect to DFD L-2
4.7.1 Constraint-1: Vulnerability of exporting confidential
information to untrusted destination
AccountDisplayActivity shows the basic information of the account to the user
interface of the Ermete SMS. It communicates with the AccountManager and receives
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//sms.addReceiver(new Receiver(address));
Receiver<D<D>> r = new Receiver(address);
sms.addReceiver(r); // Refactored
String[]<shared[shared]> projection;
//String[] projection = { CLASS, LABEL, USERNAME, PASSWORD, SENDER, COUNT, COUNT_DATE };
projection = new String[] {CLASS, LABEL, USERNAME, PASSWORD, SENDER, COUNT,
COUNT_DATE }; // Refactored
Figure 4.6: Ermete SMS refinement of the annotations
a list of account objects. While it is only responsible to show the account name in
a label and logo of the account in an image placeholder, the account object contains
the sensitive information (e.g., password, user name etc.) alongside with the account
name and the logo.
Architecturally, the display object should not contain confidential infor-
mation, and I implement a constraint to evaluate if Scoria can detect
this vulnerability. The code view (of this vulnerability) shows (Fig. 4.7)
that the field accounts:List<Account> of ADA:AccountDisplayActivity is
set by the method invocation accountManager.getAccounts() of object
accountManager:AccountManager. The code view is obtained by tracing back to
the code using ArchDoc from the selected edge of interest. The suspicious edge of
interest is shown in the console after running the constraint.
Implementation
I use ArchDoc to hide the nodes that are irrelevant to the constraint. I manu-
ally draw a partial OGraph showing the relevant objects and edges of the constraint.
The partial OGraph of the constraint shows three top level domains: UI, LOGIC and
DATA (Fig. 4.8). DATA contains accountmanager:AccountManager object that exports
providers:ArrayList<Account> to ADA:AccountDisplayActiviy. Instead of send-
ing the necessary display-only information of the accounts (account name, logo etc.),
it sends the entire account object that also contains the password and the username
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List<Account><D<D<U, L, D>>> accounts = accountManager.getAccounts();
for (Account<D<U, L, D>> account : accounts) {
TextView<lent> listItemLabel = (TextView)
listItem.findViewById(R.id.list_item_label);
TextView<lent> listItemSender = (TextView)
listItem.findViewById(R.id.list_item_sender);
ImageView<U<U, L, D>> listItemLogo = (ImageView)
listItem.findViewById(R.id.list_item_logo);
String<shared> label = account.getLabel();
if (label == null || label.equals(""))
label = getString(R.string.no_label_text);
listItemLabel.setText(label);
listItemSender.setText(account.getSender());
Figure 4.7: Entire account object is exported that contains sensitive information.
of the accounts. An export edge from accountmanager:AccountManager to the un-
trusted destination (ada:AccountDisplayActivity) is shown in red (Fig. 4.8). The
idea is to evaluate if Scoria analysis can identify this vulnerability (suspicious edge)
of the flow of the confidential data.
Result
I implement the constraint using the object transitivity feature of Scoria. In this
constraint, the flow object contains sensitive information and thus, the security prop-
erty is set as confidential. On the other hand, the sink ada:AccountDisplayActivity
is assigned as untrusted. I implement the constraint as a test case and run the test case
in JUnit. The result shows that Scoria detects the suspicious edge and reports it in
the console output of Eclipse (Fig. 4.9). However, Scoria generates a false positive by
detecting a communicating edge between accountmanager:AccountManagerAndroid
to ama:AccountModifyActivity as suspicious.
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Figure 4.8: Vulnerability regarding account object (partial OGraph)
Suspicious edge : AMAnd:AccountManagerAndroid -> ADA:AccountDisplayActivity
[providers:ArrayList<Account>]
AccountDisplayActivity refreshAccountsList accountManager.getAccounts()
Suspicious edge : AMAnd:AccountManagerAndroid -> AMA:AccountModifyActivity
[providers:ArrayList<Account>]
AccountModifyActivity chooseLabel accountManager.getAccounts()
Figure 4.9: Suspicious edges identified by Scoria.
4.7.2 Constraint-2: Vulnerability regarding SQLiteDB
Ermete SMS uses SQLite database to store sensitive information of the user.
However, while investigating the possible vulnerabilities regarding the architectural
features of Ermete, I learn that storing sensitive information in SQLiteDB is not quite
48
safe (especially without encryption).
Android SQLiteDB. SQLite is an open source light-weight SQL database that
comes with the default Android distribution. It stores the data in a structured for-
mat and supports the regular relational database’s features. The database has an
extension of .db/.sqlite. The Android package android.database.sqlite contains
the sqlite class.
By default, SQLiteDB is not accessible from other applications since every Android
application has only access to its own private SQLite databases. However, an attacker
can gain access to any sqlite database by performing some bypass operations through
available Android development features for the developers. Android DDMS allows the
attacker to explore the files and folders of an Android device including the databases
of each application. Using DDMS, the attacker can also copy a particular file into an
external disk. An attacker can further query the sqlite database to fetch information
from it. There are a number of online resources available that explain how to hack
sqlite database13 of an Android application. One of the solutions to this problem is
to encrypt sensitive data.
I investigate and find that Ermete SMS sends sensitive yet unencrypted data to the
SQLite database. The object of type AccountManager extracts sensitive information
and saves the information inside a wrapper object of type ContentValues. Since
Sqlite only contains structured data, the ContentValues is used to store the data in
key-value pairs in which the key represents the table column and the value represents
the content of a cell of a row. The corresponding vulnerability is shown in Fig. 4.10.
The method InsertAccountObject of AccountModifyActivity passes the account
object to the accountManager:AccountManagerAndroid. Later, insert method of
AccountManagerAndroid sets the wrapper object (of ContentValues) and pass it to
the db:SQLiteDatabase object. In this entire path, the confidential information was
not encrypted.
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private void InsertAccountObject(Account<D<U, L, D>> acc){
AccountModifyActivity<D<U, L, D>> AMA = new AccountModifyActivity();
accountManager = new AccountManagerAndroid(AMA);
accountManager.insert(acc);
}
public void insert(Account<D<U, L, D>> newAccount) {
ContentValues<D> values = new ContentValues();
values.put(CLASS, newAccount.getClass().getName());
values.put(LABEL, newAccount.getLabel());
values.put(USERNAME, newAccount.getUsername());
values.put(PASSWORD, newAccount.getPassword());
SQLiteDatabase<D<U, L, D>> db = new SQLiteDatabase();
db = dbOpenHelper.getWritableDatabase();
String<shared> NullColumnHack = "";
db.insert(TABLE_NAME, NullColumnHack, values);
db.close();
}
Figure 4.10: Confidential unencrypted information is passed to SQLiteDatabase object.
Before implementing the constraint, I manually verify the vulnerability related
to the SQLitedatabase. I check the vulnerability using an Android device, a device
emulator and DDMS in Eclipse. I explore the data folders, copy the database of
Ermete SMS and query through the tables to extract sensitive information (e.g., User
Name, Password, etc.).
Implementation
I draw the partial OGraph to depict the relevant objects and edges of
the constraint. In the OGraph, the top-level domain UI contains the object
AMA:AccountModifyActivity, LOGIC contains account:AccountManagerAndroid
and DATA contains the database object db:SQLiteDatabase. The confidential in-
formation flows from the UI to the DATA domain without going through an en-
cryption object. account:AccountManagerAndroid imports (blue edge) the ac-
count object (oldAccount:Account), extracts the information and wraps into the
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Figure 4.11: Vulnerability regarding SQLiteDatabase (partial OGraph)
cv:ContentValues object and exports (red object) to the db:SQLiteDatabase
(Fig. 4.11).
Result
I implement the constraint using the object transitivity and indirect communica-
tion features of Scoria. In object transitivity, all dataflow edges in a path refer to
the same flow object. Although, the information of the account object is extracted
and wrapped into another object in the middle of the path, the information remains
the same (unencrypted) on the entire path. I verify if there is any suspicious edge
exists from AMA:AccountModifyActivity to AccountManagerAndroid and if such a
suspicious edge contains a flow object of type Account, I further check if any tran-
sitive flow exists from AccountManagerAndroid to SQliteDatabase that contains a
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Suspicious edge : AMA:AccountModifyActivity -> AMAnd:AccountManagerAndroid [t:Tim]
AccountModifyActivity InsertAccountObject accountManager.insert(acc)
AccountModifyActivity DeleteAccountObject accountManager.delete(acc)
Suspicious edge : AMAnd:AccountManagerAndroid -> db:SQLiteDatabase [=?:String]
AccountManagerAndroid insert db.insert(TABLE_NAME,NullColumnHack,values)
AccountManagerAndroid delete db.delete(TABLE_NAME,whereClause,whereArgs)
Figure 4.12: Suspicious edges identified by Scoria.
flow object of type ContentValues.
The result shows that Scoria detects the suspicious edges (Fig. 4.12) along with a
false positive. Scoria detects an additional communication due to the delete operation.
This communication is false positive since it does not store any sensitive information
to the SqliteDB.
4.8 AF-index of the vulnerabilities
The weighted sum of the Scoria features of Constraint-1 is 4 that include the
object transitivity and adding security properties. Constraint-2 has a weighted sum
of value 5 that use object transitivity and indirect communication. In both cases, the
AF-index values convey that the vulnerabilities are more likely to be architectural
flaws than coding bug.
4.9 Conclusion
In Ermete SMS, the first constraint can be considered to be a common architec-
tural flaw whereas the second constraint points to an important aspect of the Android
software development. Most developers are not concerned about the security issues
(regarding destination) while passing sensitive data as an argument. If the UI layer is
not supposed to show the confidential information, only non-confidential information
should be sent. Secondly, SQLitedatabase is not a trusted source to store sensitive
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unencrypted information. An attacker can get access to the database and query the
information using a number of available tools. Scoria detects both of these constraints
successfully and reports suspicious edges along with a few false positives.
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CHAPTER 5: WEBGOAT
This chapter gives some overview of the third subject system, its architecture, its
vulnerabilities and three constraints.
5.1 WebGoat Overview
WebGoat deliberately highlights security vulnerabilities in web applications. It is
designed to illustrate the security flaws and provides a platform for the software testers
to test an application in the context of Application Security Assessment. WebGoat
is developed by Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) group.
WebGoat contains a number of categories where each category may have multiple
lessons. Each lesson may include more than one task where each task is related to a
vulnerability. In some cases, multiple lessons create one vulnerability as a whole. A
WebGoat user has to demonstrate the understanding of a vulnerability by completing
each task.
5.2 System Architecture
I run the code statistics of WebGoat (using Metrics) and it shows that the system
has 25 KLOC. I inspect the code and study the documentations. WebGoat is a
Java-based web application developed using Model-View-Controller (MVC) pattern.
In the controller, there is a generic HammerHead controller class that extends from
HttpServlet base class which is further extended by other controller classes. MODEL
contains the ActionHandler classes and a webSession class. ActionHandler classes are
the lesson objects of a category. MODEL also contains the data objects responsible
to push and pull data from and to the database. WebSession class is a middle layer
class that communicates with both MODEL and VIEW objects. An architectural
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Figure 5.1: WebGoat architecture
overview diagram is downloaded from the official website of OWASP (Fig. 5.1).
5.2.1 DFD
I draw a simplified version of the DFD to check the conformance with the extracted
OOG. Since WebGoat is a big application, in these two diagrams, I emphasize on the
objects and the dataflow edges that are part of the constraints. The DFD (Fig. 5.2)
shows three architectural tiers: MODEL, VIEW and CONTROLLER. Each object is
considered as a single process of the DFD. Following are the components of the DFD:
1. View: This layer consists of two types of objects of the presentation layer such
as UI (HTML) objects and view objects that communicates with the controller
objects and UI objects. For instance, Input, TD and PRE are the HTML objects
and HiddenFieldTampering, LogSpoofing and PathBasedAccessControl are
the corresponding view objects.
2. Controller: The Controller layer is composed of the controller objects including
the Websession that is responsible to maintain the web sessions. Each lesson
object in the MODEL layer implements the createContent method that takes
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the websession object as a parameter and creates the content of the webpage.
ParameterParser takes the parameters from the HTTP requests, parse the
parameters in each method implementation. The CreateDB object creates the
database, relevant database tables and inserts the default values to the tables
in order to initialize the database. SoapRequest implements the methods of
LessonAdapter class including getFirstName, getLastName and getLoggedIn-
Count.
3. Model: This layer consists of the business objects and other data objects (util-
ities) that communicate with the database. As an example, in the DFD,
the Course is a model that maintains the learning progress of the user of
each lesson. The Encoding object encodes and decodes sensitive data. The
DatabaseUtilities class performs the database related utility actions, i.e., get
database connection, make connection etc. The StringElement is a wrapper
class and used to wrap multiple String objects.
5.3 Annotation Process
I use the ArchDefault tool in order to add default annotations and reduce the
overhead of manually annotating the entire system.
5.3.1 Design Intent
The design intent of the WebGoat is State-Logic-Display (can be represented by
the DATA-LOGIC-UI domains) that is identical to the three tier architecture of the
system. State is the MODEL, Logic is the CONTROLLER and Display is the VIEW
layer. While adding annotations, alongside three top level domains, I use the shared
domain to annotate static objects, the unique domain to annotate objects of unshared
reference and the lent to annotate the objects inside of a method scope.
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Figure 5.2: WebGoat DFD
5.3.2 Default Annotations
I use ArchDefault tool to add the default annotations. ArchDefault generates
the starter map, and I make necessary changes in the map. I specify the domains,
formal domain parameters and unique identifiers for each row in the map. I also set
TakeDomainParams and PropagateToSubType properties as true in order to allow
domain parameters to propagate to the subtypes. I validate the map and run the
tool to add default annotations. The default tool adds most of the annotations and
after typechecking the annotations, the number of warnings are reduced to around
9K and require further manual annotations.
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class DOMInjection<U, L, D> extends LessonAdapter<U, L, D> {
static Integer DEFAULT_RANKING<shared> = new Integer(10);
String<shared> KEY = "key";
A<shared<U, L, D>> a = new A();
String<D> key = new String("K1JFWP8BSO8HI52LNPQS8F5L01N");
Con<D> getCon(String<lent> user, WebgoatContext<L<U, L, D>> context) {
Con<D> conn = connections.get(user);
if (conn != null && !conn.isClosed())
return conn;
conn = makeConnection(user, context);
connections.put(user, conn);
if (dbBuilt.get(user) == null){
CreateDB<lent<U, L, D>> createDB = new CreateDB();
createDB.makeDB(conn);
dbBuilt.put(user, Boolean.TRUE);
}
return conn;
}
Element<U<U, L, D>> createContent(WebSession<L<U,L,D>> s){
ElementContainer <U<U, L, D>> ec = new ElementContainer();
String[]<shared[shared]> allowedSelect = new String[]{"foo", "bar"};
}
Figure 5.3: WebGoat manual annotations
5.3.3 Root Class and Manual Annotations
All the String objects are annotated in the shared domain by the tool, however,
I realize that I need to place some objects of interest into distinct domains. Besides,
ArchDefault misses adding annotations for complex expressions (e.g., anonymous
object creation inside method invocations). Moreover, typechecker shows warnings
for statically initialized variables. To address these issues, I address the warnings by
priority. In some cases, I modify the code to add/modify annotations. Fig. 5.3 shows
some examples’ code changes and modification of default annotations.
The first code snippet shows that I modify the annotation of interesting String
object (“key”) by assigning it to the DATA domain although the default tool annotated
it in the Shared domain. The second code snippet shows the refactoring of the code
and adding corresponding annotations of the new instance of CreateDB to address
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@Domains({"UI", "LOGIC", "DATA"})
class WebGoatAnalysisMain {
public void Run() {
instantiateMissingObjects();
}
public void instantiateMissingObjects() {
SqlModifyData<UI<UI, LOGIC, DATA>> sqlModifyData = new SqlModifyData();
LogSpoofing<UI<UI, LOGIC, DATA>> logSpoofing = new LogSpoofing();
WebSessionLOGIC<UI, LOGIC, DATA> wSession = new WebSession(new
WebgoatContext(new HttpServlet() { }), new Servlet().getServletContext());
ForgotPassword<DATA<UI, LOGIC, DATA>> forgotPassword = new ForgotPassword();
ParameterParser<LOGIC<UI, LOGIC, DATA>> parameterParser =
wSession.getParser();
DatabaseUtilities<DATA<UI, LOGIC, DATA>> dbUtilities = new
DatabaseUtilities();
}
static void main(String[]<lent[shared]> args) {
WebGoatAnalysisMain<shared> WGAMain = new WebGoatAnalysisMain();
WGAMain.instantiateMissingObjects();
}
}
Figure 5.4: WebGoat root class
the typechecker warning of anonymous object creation. The third code snippet shows
the modification of the code to address the annotation error due to static initialization
of the String[]. I address most of the annotation warnings and reduce the number
of warnings from around 9K to around 1K.
I use the ArchMetrics tool to get the list of uninitialized types. I create a root
class (WebGoatAnalysisMain), annotate three top-level domains in it and initialize
the un-initialized types. A portion of the root class is shown in (Fig. 5.4).
5.4 Object Graph Extraction
I extract both the OOG and the OGraph, however, like other systems, both of
these graphs are large enough to visualize the entire set of OObjects and follow the
dataflow edges. The unexpanded view of the OOG is shown in (Fig. 5.5).
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Figure 5.5: WebGoat Ownership Object Graph (collapsed view)
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5.5 Conformance with the DFD
The conformance diagram (Fig. 5.6) has three tiers representing the three top
level domains: UI, LOGIC and DATA. Each domain contains a number of ob-
jects and relevant communication edges: the blue edge represents an import edge,
the red edge shows an export edge and the black arrow represents a field refer-
ence. To observe an example of the conformance with the DFD (Fig. 5.2), it
can be seen that PathBasedAccessControl process sends a decoded URL object
to the UI element TD. Analogously, there is an export communication edge from
pathBasedAccessControl:PathBasedAccessControl to td:TD.
5.6 Refinement of the Annotations
I refine the annotations to reflect my design intent and to prevent the objects of
interest from getting merged. An OOG is inconsistent with the design intent if it
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Element<U<U,L,D>> doStage6(WebSession<L<U,L,D>> s){
StringElement<U<U,L,D>> SE = new StringElement("not yet");
return SE;
}
Element<U<U,L,D>> createContent(WebSession<L<U,L,D>> s) {
String<D> listing = " <p><B>"+getLabelManager().get("CurrentDirectory")+"</B>
" + enc.urlDecode(dir) +
"<br><br>"+getLabelManager().get("ChooseFileToView")+"</p>";
StringElement<D> SE = new StringElement();
SE.addElement(listing);
td.addElement(SE);
}
Figure 5.7: Refinement of annotations (preventing objects from excessive merging)
misses some desired objects and edges due to incorrect annotations. As the type-
checker cannot recognize anonymously instantiated objects, those objects are missing
in the OGraph. Hence, code refactoring is needed. Examples are shown in Fig. 5.3.
In order to prevent some desired objects from being merged, I annotate those objects
in distinct domains. For instance, one particular instance of StringElement object
is annotated in the DATA domain while regular StringElement objects are not sig-
nificant and annotated in the UI domain (Fig.5.7). This is because listing:String
contains the sensitive data which is wrapped by SE:StringElement and thus, the
wrapper object becomes significant.
5.7 Constraints:
WebGoat contains around 66 injected vulnerabilities divided into 20 categories. I
hand select three vulnerabilities from three categories: Access Control Flaws, Injec-
tion Flaws and Parameter Tampering. I implement three constraints of three potential
architectural flaws in WebGoat to evaluate if Scoria can detect these vulnerabilities.
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5.7.1 Constraint-1: Vulnerability regarding path based ac-
cess control
Many web applications allow the users to access specific files from the disk rather
than making a copy of the file in the application’s temporary directory. Sometimes,
the directory address of the file is stored in a variable or into a hidden field that can
be exploited by an attacker to understand the file system and get access to other files.
The lesson Path Based Access Control lists a number of files in a dropdown
menu to which the user is allowed to access. However, the corresponding disk location
is also stored in a variable. A user can copy the address in a browser, get the list of
available files in the directory and get access to other files.
To understand this vulnerability from the code implementation of the Web-
Goat (Fig. 5.8), it can be noticed that enc:Encoding object sends the decoded url
(listing:String) to PathBasedAccessControl. Later, PathBasedAccessControl
wraps the flow object into SE:StringElement. Finally, the confidential object
SE:StringElement is sent to UI element td:TD that shows the decoded url to the
front end screen.
Implementation
Partial OGraph shows the interacting objects of this vulner-
ability (Fig. 5.9). An import edge from enc:Encoding object
shows that pathBasedAccessControl:PathBasedAccessControl is re-
ceiving the decoded url object, listing:String. It also shows
that pathBasedAccessControl:PathBasedAccessControl exports the
SE:StringElement object to the UI element td:TD.
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class PathBasedAccessControl<U, L, D> extends LessonAdapter<U, L, D>{
Element<U<U,L,D>> createContent(WebSession<L<U,L,D>> s){
Encoding<unique<U,L,D>> enc = new Encoding();
TD<U<U,L,D>> td = new TD();
try
{
String<D> dir = s.getContext().getRealPath("/lesson_plans/en");
String<D> listing = " <p><B>"+getLabelManager().get("CurrentDirectory")+"</B>
" + enc.urlDecode(dir) + "<br><br>"+getLabelManager().get("ChooseFileToView")+"</p>";
StringElement<D> SE = new StringElement();
SE.addElement(listing);
td.addElement(SE);
}
}
}
Figure 5.8: SE:StringElment is sent to td:TD
Result
I implement the constraint using the object provenance and object transi-
tivity features of Scoria. In this constraint, the flow object contains sensitive
information and thus, it is set as confidential. On the other hand, the sink
ada:AccountDisplayActivity is considered as untrusted. Scoria successfully iden-
tifies the suspicious edge and reports it in the console output of eclipse (Fig. 5.10).
5.7.2 Constraint-2: Log Spoofing
One of the common vulnerabilities of web applications is the spoofing of the log
file. A web application can store each user interaction’s success/failure message into
the system log. A common example of the logging event is the user authentication
system that stores the time of user’s signing in and signing out information along
with a message. While creating the message, a developer can use the content of the
input boxes to dynamically create the message content. Hence, an attacker with keen
HTML knowledge can exploit the HTML input box to manipulate the content of the
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Figure 5.9: pathBasedAccessControl:PathBasedAccessControl exports
SE:StringElement to td:TD
Information disclosure exists.
Suspicious edge : pathBasedAccessControl:PathBasedAccessControl -> td:TD [SE:StringElement]
PathBasedAccessControl createContent td.addElement(SE)
Suspicious edge : pathBasedAccessControl:PathBasedAccessControl -> td:TD [SE:StringElement]
PathBasedAccessControl createContent td.addElement(SE)
Figure 5.10: Suspicious edges identified by Scoria
message and thus, can misguide the system administrator when she checks the logged
messages to trace a system failure.
Code inspection shows that ParameterParser object sends the content of
the “UserName” input field to the LogSpoofing object which in turn sends the
inputUserName:String to an UI element pre:PRE. In WebGoat, PRE is an UI el-
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class LogSpoofing<U, L, D> extends LessonAdapter<U, L, D>{
Element<U<U,L,D>> createContent(@Domain("L<U,L,D>") WebSession<L<U,L,D>> s){
String<U> inputUsername = s.getParser().getRawParameter(USERNAME, "");
// Representative of Log. File: ’PRE’
PRE<D> pre = new PRE(getLabelManager().get("LoginFailedForUserName")+": " +
inputUsername);
pre.addElement(inputUsername);
}
}
Figure 5.11: inputUsername:String is sent to pre:PRE
ement that shows the modified logged information and acts as a representative of the
log file (Fig. 5.11).
Implementation
(Fig. 5.12) illustrates the partial OGraph of the Log Spoofing and shows
a transitive dataflow of the confidential object inputUsername:String from
myParser:ParameterParser to the destination object pre:PRE.
Result
I implement this constraint using the object transitivity and object provenance
features of Scoria and Scoria successfully identifies the suspicious edges due to the
import and export of the confidential object inputUsername:String (Fig. 5.13).
5.7.3 Constraint-3: Vulnerability regarding hidden field
tampering
The use of a hidden field for storing sensitive information temporarily is a common
practice in web development. However, attackers can be intelligent enough to quickly
verify if an web application uses a hidden field to store any information. Once such
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Figure 5.12: logSpoofing:LogSpoofing exports inputUsername:String to pre:PRE
Suspicious Edge exporting malicious object to Log:
Suspicious edge : myParser:ParameterParser -> logSpoofing:LogSpoofing [:String]
LogSpoofing createContent s.getParser().getRawParameter(USERNAME,"")
Suspicious edge : logSpoofing:LogSpoofing -> pre:PRE [inputUsername:String]
LogSpoofing createContent pre.addElement(inputUsername)
Figure 5.13: Suspicious edges identified by Scoria
a vulnerability is found, they can tamper the content of the hidden field to commit
a potential harm to the application. In WebGoat, a hidden field is used to store a
cumulative figure of money transactions of an e-commerce shopping cart. An attacker,
who intends to buy a list of items of $3000, can send a cumulative figure of $1000
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class HiddenFieldTampering<U, L, D> extends LessonAdapter<U, L, D>{
String<D> PRICE_TV = new String("2999.99");
Element<U<U,L,D>> createContent(WebSession<L<U,L,D>> s){
float quantity, total;
String<lent> price = PRICE_TV;
DecimalFormat<lent> money = new DecimalFormat("$0.00");
try{
price = s.getParser().getRawParameter(PRICE, PRICE_TV);
quantity = s.getParser().getFloatParameter("QTY", 1.0f);
total = quantity * Float.parseFloat(price);
} catch (Exception<lent> e){
s.setMessage(getLabelManager().get("Invaild data") + this.getClass().getName());
price = PRICE_TV;
quantity = 1.0f;
total = quantity * Float.parseFloat(PRICE_TV);
}
if (price.equals(PRICE_TV)) {
Input<U<U,L,D>> input = new Input(Input.HIDDEN, PRICE, PRICE_TV);
input.addElement(PRICE_TV);
}
}
}
Figure 5.14: PRICE TV is send to the input element
to the server while checking out the items by tampering the hidden field. Thus, a
hidden field should not be used as a temporary storage of the sensitive information.
The code-view (Fig. 5.14) of the HiddenFieldTampering class shows that
hiddenFieldTampering:HiddenFieldTampering sends sensitive data (PRICE TV )
to the hidden type input object (input:Input).
Implementation
Partial OGraph shows the insecure dataflow (export edge) to the
input:Input from hiddenFieldTampering:HiddenFieldTampering (Fig. 5.15).
PRICE TV:String is the confidential flow object that is tampered by the attacker
when tv price is stored in the hidden field.
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Figure 5.15: Vulnerability regarding hidden field tampering (partial OGraph)
Vulnerability found regarding Tampering of Hidden Input Field.
Suspicious edge : hiddenFieldTampering:HiddenFieldTampering -> input:Input [PRICE_TV:String]
HiddenFieldTampering createContent input.addElement(PRICE_TV)
Figure 5.16: Suspicious edges identified by Scoria
Result
I implement the constraint using the object transitivity feature of Scoria. I also
add two security properties. Scoria finds the suspicious communication edges as
shown in the output (Fig. 5.16).
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5.8 AF-index of the vulnerabilities
Constraint-1 and Constraint-2 have a weighted sum of 5 due to the object transi-
tivity and object provenance features of Scoria. Constraint-3 uses object transitivity
and security properties and has an index value of 4. The AF-index of these constraints
represents significance of the vulnerabilities in the continuum of architectural flaws.
5.9 Conclusion
These three selected vulnerabilities are important and significant in the context of
architectural flaws in web applications. Scoria identifies all the three vulnerabilities
(mentioned above) without generating any false positive.
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Table 6.1: AF-indexes of the constraints
Constraint Obj.
Provenance. (3)
Obj.
Transitivity. (2)
Ind.
Comm. (3)
Sec.
Prop. (1)
AF-Index (1-10)
Shared Pref. X X 5
Android Log X X 5
Inf. Disclosure X X(2) 4
SQLite DB X X 5
Path-based Acc. Ctrl. X X 5
Log Spoofing X X 5
Hidden Fld. Tampr. X X(2) 4
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION
This chapter summarizes the AF-index of the vulnerabilities, discusses the preci-
sion of the results, estimated efforts of the subject systems and threats to validity of
the approach.
6.1 AF-indexes of the vulnerabilities
I summarize the AF-indexes of all the vulnerabilities of the three subject systems.
Table 6.1 shows that the vulnerabilities regarding Android sharedpreference and An-
droid log file have an AF-index value of 5. The constraint Information Disclosure has
a value of 4 and SQLiteDB has an AF-index value of 5. Path-based Access Control
and Log Spoofing have a value of 5 and Hidden Field Tampering has a value of 4.
Since the AF-indexes of all the constraints are in the middle of the AF-index scale,
the vulnerabilities are closer to being architectural flaws than coding bugs.
6.2 Precision of the results
Figure 6.2 shows the precision of the results in terms of the TP (True Positive),
FP (False Positive), TN (True Negative) and FN (False Negative). A TP defines that
Scoria detects the vulnerability, FP defines that Scoria reports a false vulnerability,
TN is the true reporting when the vulnerability is absent in the system and FN is
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Table 6.2: Accuracy of the result
System KLOC No. of Constraints TP TN FP FN
Muspy 6 2 2 1 0 0
Ermete SMS 6 2 2 0 2 0
WebGoat 25 3 3 0 0 0
defined by not reporting of the vulnerability when it exists. We compute the Precision
as TP/(TP+FP) and it is around 80%.
6.3 Scoria detects Common Android Architectural Flaws
From the analyses and results, I observe two common architectural flaws in An-
droid application development. First, SharedPreference should not be considered as
trusted data storage although SharedPreference storage is application independent in
an Android device. Second, SQLiteDB also cannot be a trusted source for storing
data since the database is accessible through DDMS. Scoria analysis detects both of
these vulnerabilities and shows that both Muspy and Ermete SMS is vulnerable as
they do not encrypt the sensitive data before storing in the SharedPreference and
SQLiteDB.
6.4 Scoria detects Common Webapplication Architectural
Flaws
Scoria detects three important architectural flaws of a web application; path-based
access control, log spoofing and hidden field tampering. All of the three vulnerabilities
are significant in web applications.
6.5 Impact of Code implementation over Scoria approach
Refinement of the annotations is impacted by different approaches of coding prac-
tices of different subject systems. The typechecker shows warnings if it cannot handle
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Table 6.3: Estimated Effort of Muspy
Phase Estimated Effort Percent %
Annotations and object graph extraction 13 hours 46.5
Extraction 5 minutes less than 1
DFD and OOG conformance 4 hours 14
Refine object graph 4 hours 14
Writing constraints 7 hours 25.4
Total 28 hours 100%
Table 6.4: Estimated Effort of Ermete SMS
Phase Estimated Effort Percent %
Annotations and object graph extraction 15 hours 56
Extraction 3 minutes less than 1
DFD and OOG conformance 4 hours 15
Refine object graph 3 hours 11
Writing constraints 5 hours 18
Total 28 hours 100%
some code constructs while checking the consistency of the annotations with the code.
To address these warnings, code refactoring may be needed. For example, in some
coding practice, an anonymous object can be created rather than creating an actual
instance of a type. However, the typechecker expects a named instance of a type.
6.6 Estimated efforts of finding security vulnerabilities
The estimated effort of the three subject systems for finding security vulnerabilities
are shown in Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. The efforts are computed in terms of Phase,
Effort and Percentage of the effort of each phase. The tables show that estimated
effort is higher in WebGoat since it is larger in size (KLOC) than other two systems
whereas Muspy and Ermete SMS took similar effort.
6.7 Threats to Validity
I inject a vulnerability since the subject system Muspy does not contain any
vlunerability regarding Android log. Despite the vulnerability being injected, it allows
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Table 6.5: Estimated Effort of WebGoat
Phase Estimated Effort Percent %
Annotations and object graph extraction 40 hours 60
Extraction 6 minutes less than 1
DFD and OOG conformance 7 hours 10
Refine object graph 3 hours 12
Writing constraints 12 hours 18
Total 67 hours 100%
us to understand that Scoria could detect if there is a vulnerability of the Android
log. Secondly, the design intent of the security architect can have a significant impact
over the approach. The security architect may not be the system architect. Moreover,
if the documentation of the system is not sufficient, the security architect may choose
different annotations that lead Scoria to extract different OOGs and OGraphs. Such
an OGraph may contain objects in unexpected domains. As a result, while writing
constraints, security architect may not find the significant vulnerabilities. Also, the
analysis may generate more false positives.
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CHAPTER 7: RELATED WORK
This chapter discusses related work and comparative studies of the evaluation of
different tools that find security vulnerabilities.
7.1 Evaluation of Static Analysis Tools
I divide the related work that highlight the evaluation of static analysis tools into
ones that focus on coding bugs and those that focus on architectural flaws.
7.1.1 Tools that Focus on Coding Bugs
Nathaniel et al. evaluate most downloaded open source static analysis tool named
FindBugs. FindBugs detects common coding bugs, e.g., null pointer dereferencing
and overflow of an array .14 According to the authors, Google used FindBugs and
identified 70 null pointer errors in their code. While evaluating FindBugs, alongside
positive testing, the authors also perform negative testing for which FindBugs cannot
report all the vulnerabilities. Moreover, the authors find that FindBugs misses null
pointer dereferencing errors if a particular path of the program is executed. The
authors reason that FindBugs does not compute the feasibility of the path.
Nathan et al. evaluate a vulnerability analysis framework named MINESTRONE
that detects coding bugs especially memory corruption, null pointer dereferencing,
resource drain and number handling errors .15 The authors explain the four com-
ponents of the MINESTRONE: DYBOC (detects buffer overflows and underflows),
REASSURE (for error recovery mechanism), ResMon and IOC number handling.
ResMon detects the vulnerabilities related to the resource leakage. IOC number
handling identifies the incorrect numeric value handling errors (e.g., unsafe unsigned-
to-signed conversion). According to the authors, MINESTRONE is able to analyze
large projects up to 200 KLOC. The authors create two test suites each of which
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consists of a number of test cases. The first suite contains 340 hand written vul-
nerable programs and second suite contains a number of open source projects. Each
of the test cases consists of a good and bad I/O pairs. The analysis is marked as
passed for one test case if it passes for both the I/O pairs. The authors show that
MINESTRONE reports 80% of the errors effectively.
Mamun et al. publish a paper on comparative evaluation of four static analy-
sis tools (Coverity Prevent, Jtest, FindBugs and JLint) that find concurrency bugs.
The authors aim to find if the commercial tools are better performed than the open
source tools.16 They discuss the working mechanism of each of the tools and different
types of concurrency bugs and patterns. According to the authors, non-determinism
of the concurrency issues trigger a number of bugs including data races, atomicity
violations, synchronization defects, deadlocks and livelocks. The authors use an ex-
isting benchmark of 87 unique Java concurrency bug patterns. The results show that
the commercial tool JTest performs better in detecting java concurrency bugs with
a relatively higher number of false positives. On the other hand, Coverity Prevent
detects lowest number of bugs although it produces less false positives.
Vorobyov and Krishnan evaluates two different types of tools: a Model Checking
tool named CBMC and a static analysis tool named Parafit .17 According to the
authors, a model checker generates the run time states of the program and for a
finite number of states a model checker performs an exhaustive analysis. If the model
fails to verify a certain specified property, the result will be a failed verification.
The authors evaluate the results with a set of criteria: false Positive, false Negative,
execution time and resource consumed. They evaluate the tools using the test cases
from three existing benchmarks: Iowa, SAMATE and Cigital. The results show that
although CBMC shows greater accuracy (97%) and zero false positive, the analysis
took significant amount of execution time (19 hours) and consumes significant memory
(2.5 GB at the peak). The authors also conclude that for larger systems CBMC is
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not quite feasible.
Gomes et al. perform an extensive study over a number of available static analysis
tools to evaluate the tools and their performance in different scenarios. According to
the authors, some static analysis tools are language specific and some are not. FxCop,
StyleCop and CodeIt are specific to the Microsoft .Net framework whereas PMD and
JLint are Java-specific. SPlint, PloySpace, CodeSonar and HP Code Advisor are
specific for C and C++.18 Coverity Prevent, Klockwork Insight, Hammurapi, RATS
and Understand support C,C++, C# and Java. The authors evaluate the tools
with 14 different test cases collected from benchmarks of SM, BIND and WU-FTPD
regarding buffer overflow where each test case contains two constraints; a “BAD”
case and an “OK” case. A tool passes one test case only if it satisfies both of the
constraints. The authors show that the top perform tools in terms of generating true
positives is SPlint and PolySpace with a success rate of 87% and 57% respectively.
7.1.2 Tools that Focus on Architectural Flaws
Vanciu et al. perform a comparative evaluation of a code level approach, Flow-
Droid, and an architectural level approach, Scoria. Although these two approaches
are different, the evaluation focuses on the precision and recall11 of the results. The
authors explain the Scoria approach and the steps that a Security Information Worker
(SIW) is required to follow to perform analysis using Scoria. The authors also explain
different code level approaches such as Fortify and AppScan. According to the au-
thors, Scoria uses an object graph whereas FlowDroid uses a precomputed call graph.
The authors design a few test cases and hand selects a number of test cases from
existing benchmarks (DroidBench and SAMATE) and divide them into a number of
equivalent classes. The authors show that FlowDroid detects the vulnerabilities that
are more related to coding bugs whereas Scoria shows better precision and recall in
detecting architectural flaws.
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Zeineb et al. evaluate four static software analysis tools: MOPS, SPlint, Graph-
Match and Fortify.19 The authors explain the detailed methodologies of these tools.
MOPS is a model checking approach, SPlint is a dataflow analysis tool, GraphMatch
creates a SDG (system dependence graph) that is an extension of a program depen-
dence graph (PDG), and Fortify uses control flow and dataflow analyses, and runs on
multiple environments (Windows, Linux and Mac). While MOPS, SPlint and Graph-
Match analyze C program, Fortify supports multiple programming languages. The
authors show that among these tools only GraphMatch and Fortify detect security
vulnerabilities for the selected test cases.
Zitsar et al. assess five static analysis tools: ARCHER, BOON, PloySpace, SPlint
and UNO. They use 14 predesigned test cases regarding buffer overflows of three
existing software; BIND, SendMail and WU-FTPD .20 The authors perform two
types of evaluation; ability of the tools to analyze the application as a whole, ability
of detecting the buffer overflow vulnerabilities separately. The authors input the
entire SendMail application (+145 KLOC) and observe that none of the tools has
finished the analysis. The authors then evaluate the tools over individual test cases.
Based on the results, the authors draw an ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic)
curve that shows that PloySpace is more successful in detecting the vulnerabilities
as well as generating less false positives than that of other tools. PolySpace shows
p(d) = 0.85 (detection of vulnerabilities) and p(f) = 0.50 (false positives) whereas
the closest result to the PolySpace has been shown by SPlint with values of p(d) =
0.60, and p(f) = 0.43 respectively.
Pomorova and Ivanchyshyn perform an assessment of four commercial static anal-
ysis tools; PVS Studio, PC-Lint, Goanna Studio and Cppcheck .21 These tools are
suggested by US National Institute of Standards and Technology for static program
analysis. The authors evaluate these tools using 25 different test cases of the follow-
ing categories: Race Condition, Input Validation, Exception, SQL Injection, Buffer
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Overflow, Stack Overflow and Integer overflow. The results show that CppCheck has
higher precision and recall in combined whereas both PVS-Studio and Goanna have
higher precision than CppCheck individually, however, recall is significantly lower
than that of CppCheck.
7.2 Evaluation of Dynamic Analysis Tools
Egele et al. perform a comprehensive study of dynamic analysis tools in the con-
text of malware detection .22 According to the authors, the evasion techniques (self
modification of the code) employed by a malicious software thwarts static analysis
tools and lead to choosing dynamic analysis to find the vulnerabilities. The authors
explain different categories of malwares: Worm, Virus, Trojan horse, Spyware, Bot
and Rootkit. They also explain different features of malware analysis: Function
Call Monitoring, Function parameter analysis, Information Flow Tracking, Instruc-
tion Trace and Autostart extensibility points. The authors discuss the techniques
of addressing these features and the underlying implementation details of the tools.
They also show a behavioral grouping of the tools based on the similarity of the
implementation, i.e., addressing a family of malware evasion techniques.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
This chapter discusses the contribution of the research and the prospects of the
future work.
8.1 Contribution
The contribution of this work is twofold. First, I hypothesize that Scoria detects
the architectural flaws in large applications from different application domains. I show
the results and explain that Scoria analysis detects the architectural flaws in large
Android applications as well as in web application with few false positives. Secondly,
Scoria detects a few vulnerabilities that are both common and significant in Android
application development.
8.2 Future Work
WebGoat has more than 60 injected vulnerabilities and I implement three con-
straints. More constraints can be implemented for WebGoat. Scoria can be evaluated
on more desktop applications. One area of future work is the comparative evaluation
with other approaches that also aims to find architectural flaws in systems.23 Scoria
can also be evaluated micro test cases relevant to web application security from the
benchmark SecuriBenchMicro.24
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The cost of security vulnerabilities of a software system is high. As a result,
many techniques have been developed to find the vulnerabilities at development time.
Of particular interest are static analysis techniques that can consider all possible
executions of a system. But, static analysis can suffer from a large number of false
positives.
A recently developed approach, Scoria, is a semi-automated static analysis that
requires security architects to annotate the code, typecheck the annotations, extract a
hierarchical object graph and write constraints in order to find security vulnerabilities
in a system.
This thesis evaluates Scoria on three systems (sizes 6 KLOC, 6 KLOC and
25 KLOC) from different application domains (Android and Web) and confirms that
Scoria can find security vulnerabilities in those systems without an excessive number
of false positives.
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